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Wrong site surgery (WSS) is such an egregious 
mistake that it has been labeled by one National 
Quality Forum (NQF) health safety expert 
as a “never event.”1 Never events are defined 
as occurences that are “of concern to both 
the public and healthcare professionals and 
providers; clearly identifiable and measurable 
(and thus feasible to include in a reporting 
system); and of a nature such that the risk 
of occurrence is significantly influenced by 
the policies and procedures of the healthcare 
organization.”2 The effects can be devastating for 
both the patient and the surgical team.3 WSSs 
are widely considered to be preventable medical 
errors, easily derailed by a series of very basic 
verification steps.1,3,4 Yet, according to estimates, 
the prevalence may be as high as 40 WSS events 
per week across the nation.5
When compared to the total number of U.S. 
operative cases performed annually, WSSs 
are still very rare.1 However, in recent years 
the incidence of WSS reported to The Joint 
Commission has increased from 15 cases 
in 1998 to a total of 956 cases by late 2010 
and, because reporting is voluntary, there is 
strong speculation that the official number of 
actual cases may be grossly underreported.3,6 
Regardless of the cause of the trend WSSs 
remain a devastating and potentially costly 
problem within the surgical setting.1 
The issue of WSS errors is not new. Prior to the 
release of the Institute of Medicine’s (IOM) 
report To Err Is Human, there was no process 
for recognizing, reporting and tracking injuries 
and near misses in the surgical setting.3 As 
such, surgeons were largely unaware of the 
widespread nature of this issue.3 Following 
the release of the IOM report, a 2003 Joint 
Commission summit brought together a multi-
disciplinary team of health care professionals 
to examine and address the scope of WSS.3,5 
Their work led to the creation of a protocol, The 
Universal Protocol for Preventing Wrong Site, 
Wrong Procedure, and Wrong Person Surgery.3,5 
Rooted in prevention theories derived in high-risk 
industries like aviation and nuclear weaponry, the 
Universal Protocol outlines three key elements for 
systems change to prevent WSS.3
1.  Pre-operative verification
2.  Marking the operative site
3.  Taking a time-out
In 2009, The Joint Commission charged its newly 
formed Center for Transforming Healthcare 
with the task of addressing the problem of WSS.5 
Thomas Jefferson University and Hospitals 
(TJUH) was one of eight organizations that 
agreed to participate in a WSS project. The 
Jefferson organization has 57 operating rooms 
across all campuses, and performed over 38,000 
surgical procedures last fiscal year.
The Wrong Site Surgery project is designed 
to address the problem using Robust Process 
Improvement (RPI) methods.5 RPI is a fact-
based, systematic, and data-driven problem-
solving methodology that incorporates tools 
and methods from both the Lean Six Sigma 
and change management methodologies.5 
Lean Six Sigma is a business methodology 
that aims to eliminate variation in product by 
employing lessons learned the manufacturing 
setting. Using RPI, the project teams measure 
the magnitude of the problem (or in the case of 
WSS, the specific problems that increase the risk 
of this event), pinpoint the contributing causes, 
develop specific solutions that are targeted 
to each cause, and then thoroughly test the 
solutions in real life situations.5 
The TJUH project focused on Orthopedic 
services. Because of the laterality that is inherent 
in these procedures, Orthopedics ranks nationally 
among the top five service lines in which WSSs 
most commonly occur.3 At TJUH, every step in 
the process of scheduling and preparing a patient 
for surgery was reviewed to identify potential 
variations that could lead to errors. 
After building a team and identifying key 
stakeholders, TJUH members set about 
initiating processes to measure inconsistencies 
and variations from policies, standards, and 
standard operating procedures. The team quickly 
discovered opportunities for improvement during 
the scheduling phase, including incomplete 
paperwork, illegible writing, and missing 
documentation. Within the actual operating room 
suites, the team observed that not all surgical 
team members were actively engaged in the 
time-out process. It was also noted that some site 
markings tended to fade after the application of 
the surgical scrub. In all of the areas, the team 
noted staff members appeared to be rushed to 
complete all tasks prior to the start of the surgical 
procedure. The findings at TJUH very closely 
mirrored the common contributions to errors 
found in a much larger 2007 state wide study 
performed by Clarke, Johnston and Finley.7 
Following an examination of their findings, the 
TJUH team instituted several significant changes 
within the study areas. To improve the accuracy 
of the scheduling process, fax numbers were 
consolidated and a process was created to notify 
physician offices prior to the day of surgery when 
primary documents were missing. The team 
also redesigned the scheduling form to eliminate 
unnecessary or irrelevant fields. As a result of 
these changes, the proportion of variation in the 
scheduling area improved from 77% to 35%. 
The rates were calculated using data obtained 
from baseline audits compared to post solutions 
implementation. The data was submitted to the 
Center for Transforming Healthcare and entered 
into the electronic program.
In the pre-operative holding area, the surgical 
marker was changed to one that would not be 
removed by the operative site preparatory scrub. 
Education was provided to the staff to reinforce 
the importance of verifying the patient’s identity 
and comparing their verbalized information 
against the signed surgical consent. Lastly, the 
team mandated that all regional blocks performed 
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by anesthesia personnel have both a formal pre-
procedure time-out and a standard site marking. 
As a result of these revised processes, the rate of 
variation was reduced from 73% to 12%. 
Processes in the operating room suites were 
revised to include the implementation of a role-
based time-out. The role-based time-out and the 
development of a surgical safety checklist (based 
on the WHO Surgical Safety Checklist) engages 
the entire surgical team and ensures their active 
participation in the time out process. The TJUH 
team also devised and implemented a modified 
staffing model for the orthopedic service, which 
included an increase from two to three staff 
members assigned for most rooms. This addition 
was a direct result of the findings of a pre-
assessment nursing survey which identified that 
nurses felt rushed when setting up the cases. As a 
result of these process changes, the rate of variation 
was reduced from 68% to 48%. 
Collaborating with the Joint Commission Center for 
Transforming Healthcare in the Wrong Site Surgery 
initiative was an excellent opportunity to learn 
from other health care organizations throughout 
the country. The engagement provided hospital 
leadership with tools to improve current processes 
and measure improvement. The project results were 
shared with the hospital community at large and 
support the TJUH mission of providing safe, quality 
healthcare to our patients. 
Richard Webster, RN, MSN 
Vice President, Perioperative Services 
Administrator, Musculoskeletal Services 
Monica Young, RN, DNP, MBA, FACHE 
Sr. Clinical Director, Perioperative Services
James H. Rowe, RN, MSN, BA, CNOR 
Perioperative Nursing Informatics Specialist 
Carol A. Kelly, RN, MSN 
Clinical Nurse Specialist, Performance Improvement
For more information on this project contact: 
Monica.Young.2@jeffersonhospital.org
REFERENCES
1.  Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality. Patient Safety Net. Patient Safety Primers. Never events. http://psnet.ahrq.gov/primer.aspx?primerID=3. Accessed on February 9, 2012.
2.  The Leapfrog Group. Fact Sheet. Never Events. http://www.leapfroggroup.org/media/file/Leapfrog-Never_Events_Fact_Sheet.pdf Accessed April 19, 2012.
3.  Mulloy DF, Hughes RG. Chapter 36. Wrong site surgery: A preventable medical error. In: Hughes RG, ed. Patient Safety and Quality: An Evidence-Based Handbook for Nurses. Rockville, MD: Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality; 2008:2-382 – 2-395. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK2678/pdf/ch36.pdf. Accessed on November 10, 2011. 
4.  Boodman SG. The pain of wrong site surgery. The Washington Post. June 20, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/the-pain-of-wrong-site-surgery/2011/06/07/AGK3uLdH_story.html. 
Accessed on November 10, 2011. 
5.  Joint Commission Center for Transforming Healthcare. The wrong site surgery project. http://www.centerfortransforminghealthcare.org/UserFiles/file/CTH_Wrong_Site_Surgery_
Project_6_24_11.pdf. Accessed March 26, 2012. 
6.  The Joint Commission. Sentinel event statistics as of September 30, 2010. http://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/Stats_with_all_fields_hidden30September2010_(2).pdf. Accessed on 
February 9, 2012.
7.  Clarke JG, Johnston J, Finley ED. Getting surgery right. Ann Surgery.2007; 243(3):395-405. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1959354/?tool=pubmed. Accessed on February 9, 2012.
